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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-RESPONSIBILITY-TEST OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL CASES-MNAGHTEN RULE REAFFIRMED AND DURHAM TEST REJECTED
-The defendant was charged with three counts of first degree murder alleging
that he shot and killed his mother, father and sister. The defendant was tried and
found guilty in the first degree and the jury assessed the death penalty upon each
count. The district court approved the verdict and sentenced the defendant to
death. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas the defendant introduced testi-
mony to the effect that he was suffering from simple schizophrenia, that he under-
stood the nature of his acts and that they were prohibited by law, and that he was
subject to punishment. A psychiatrist had testified that the defendant felt no
emotions whatsoever, and that in his own private withdrawn world, it was just as
right to kill a person as to kill an animal or a fly. Realizing that such a mental
condition would not meet the test of the M'Naghten Rule, defendant argued that
the rule should be changed and that the court should adopt the test announced in
Durham v. United States, 94 App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430
(1954), to the effect that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. Held, judgment of con-
viction affirmed; the court concluded that there is no better test, at present, for
the protection of society than the M'Naghten Rule. In holding that the defendant
should be held to be responsible for his criminal acts, the court declared that '"We
cannot say that one who knows the rules of society and the state, may violate those
rules without committing a crime simply because in his warped moral concepts of
the world, he conceives it to be right for him to do the proscribed acts." State v.
Andrews, 189 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1960).
The general rule is that the test for determining liability for commission of a
criminal act is whether the defendant was capable of distinguishing between right
and wrong at the time and with respect to the act committed. 22 C.J.S., Criminal
Law, §59, p.124; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, §40, p.796; M'Naghten's Case, 10
Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng.Reprint 718 (1843). This rule was stated in Kansas in
State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 P. 159 (1884), and reaffirmed in State v. Mendzlew-
ski, 180 Kan. 11, 299 P.2d 598 (1956). The "irresistible impulse" extension of
the "right and wrong test" had been rejected in the same jurisdiction in State v.
Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 P. 282 (1887) and in subsequent cases. State v. Arnold,
79 Kan. 533, 100 P. 64 (1909); State v. White, 112 Kan. 83, 209 P. 660 (1922).
In arriving at its decision in the Andrews case the court followed State v. Lucas,
30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959), where, in a felony murder prosecution of de-
fendant who allegedly set a church rectory fire resulting in deaths, the defendant
could differentiate between right and wrong but because of congenital mental
retardation and schizophrenia had not "freedom of choice," defendant was held
legally sane under the M'Naghten rule.
In rejecting the Durham test the Kansas court followed a growing number
of state and federal courts. "The Durham test has been singularly unsuccessful in
winning adherents." State v. Lucas, supra. at p.67. At least fifteen state supreme
courts have specifically repudiated Durham. (Cal., Conn., Ill., Ind., Mass., Md.,
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Mont., Nev., N.J., Okla., Pa., Tex., Vt., Wash.) Cf. annotation in 45 A.L.R.2d
1447, at page 1,452 and supplementary service thereto. The Durham test was also
rejected in Howard v. US., 232 F.2d 274 (5 Cir. 1956); Andersen v. U.S., 237
F.2d 118 (9 Cir. 1956); Voss v. U.S., 259 F.2d 699 (8 Cir. 1958); U.S. v. Kunak,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954). In Andersen v. U.S., supra., the court
indicated that it had; ". . . no desire to join the courts of New Hampshire and the
District of Columbia in their 'magnificent isolation' of rebellion against M'Naghten,
even though New Hampshire has been traveling down that lonesome road since
1870." Cf. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 339 (1870).
It is reported that the Durham rule has been adopted by statute in the Virgin
Islands. Cf. Muller, Criminal Law and Administration, Capacity, 1958, Annual
Survey of American Law, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 84. In State v. Kirkhen, 7 Utah
2d 108, 319 P.2d 859 (1958), the court approved a jury instruction similar to the
Durham test.
The attacks on the Durham test have taken various forms. The terminology
used by the Durham court, especially "mental disease and defect" have been criti-
cized by both the courts and psychologists and psychiatrists. State v. Goyet, Vt.,
132 A.2d 623 (1957); Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision,
5 CATH. U. L. REV. 25 (1955); Nolan, Freedom of the Will and the Irresistible
Impulse, 5 CATH. U. L. REV. 55 (1955). The causation factor, i.e., that the de-
fendant may be held unaccountable for his criminal act because the act was the
"product" or "mental disease or mental defect," has also been criticized. State v.
Lucas, supra.; State v. Goyet, supra. In the Lucas case the court stressed that many
psychiatrists maintain that all criminals are suffering from some mental disease
which can be said to cause their criminal acts. Cf. DeGrazia, The Distinction of
Being Mad, 22 U. of OHIO L. REV. 339, 343 (1955); Roche, Criminality and
Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. of OHIO L. REv. 339, 343
(1955); DeGrazia, Crime Without Punishment, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 746 (1952).
The Durham test has been rejected as not meeting the practical needs of a test to
be applied by a jury of laymen, State v. Collins, 50 Wash.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660
(1957), and as being too vague and ambiguous. People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill.2d
60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (1957).
The major criticism leveled at Durham would seem to be the lack of cer-
tainty on the part of psychiatry in being able to determine the criminal responsi-
bility of the accused within the meaning of the test. Revard v. State, OKL., 332
P.2d 967 (1958). This view as stated in the Lucas case is:
"If the question of what is a mental disease or defect is a psychiatric one, then
the law has abdicated its function of determining criminal responsibility to the
psychiatrist and the jury will have to accept the unopposed psychiatric view of
mental disease or defect. The test will differ with the prevailing psychiatric winds
of the moment."
Seven years after Judge Bazelon's famous Durham decision the test he enun-
ciated has won few, if any, adherents in other courts. The prevailing judicial
thinking is aptly summed up by Professor Hall: 'Legal controls cannot be aban-
doned in response to the alleged findings of current science until it is ascertained
whether the scientific knowledge necessary for effective operation of the new laws
is actually available." Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L. J.
761,762 (1956).
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TORTS-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY-BLASTING---CONCUSSION DAMAGE-The de-
fendant, while excavating a ditch some 200 feet from plaintiff's residence, deto-
nated an explosive charge which damaged plaintiff's house. Defendant demurred
because plaintiff failed to allege: (1) that defendant was negligent; (2) that
rocks or debris were thrown onto plaintiff's property; or (3) that the amount of
explosives used was excessive. On appeal, held: order overruling demurrer
affirmed. The complaint did state a cause of action, without alleging any of these,
since the South Carolina court, in this case of first impression, has decided to
adopt the rule of absolute liability for damage caused by use of explosives, regard-
less of whether the damage is done by actual physical invasion of plaintiff's prop-
erty or merely by vibration and concussion. Wallace v. Guion & Co., 117 S.E. 2d
359 (S. Carolina 1961).
This problem involves the conflict between the right to enjoy one's property
to the fullest, and the duty to avoid injuring the property of another. By its
decision, the South Carolina court is giving priority to the latter duty over the
former right. Most jurisdictions agree that when the explosion causes rocks or
debris to actually go upon plaintiff's land, that such an invasion is a common-law
trespass and thus the defendant is held absolutely liable. Hay V. Cohoes County,
2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
A split of authority, however, is found on the question of damages inflicted
not by physical invasion, but by either vibrations (through the ground) or con-
cussion (through the air). The New York rule, rejected by the South Carolina
court, requires proof of negligence in these latter cases. In Booth v. Rome, W. and
0. Terminal Co., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893), the court held that the
imposition of absolute liability would be a "far-reaching" decision, and alluded to
the solid-rock nature of the island of Manhattan, of necessity requiring blasting to
construct buildings. The Court of Appeals reasoned that to impose absolute lia-
bility would be to allow one person to blast, in putting up the first building in
an area, and then give him the power to refuse the same privilege to subsequent
persons wishing to build in the same area. Therefore, though a high degree of
care was to be imposed, still liability would have to be based on negligence.
The South Carolina court, however, prefers the arguments of Judge Augustus
Hand in Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931). This
case was strict, much more so than the South Carolina case, since it imposed abso-
lute liability on a defendant who merely stored dynamite. Judge Hand reasoned
that explosives are so intrinsically dangerous that one who uses or stores them
under such circumstances as to cause others injury should be absolutely liable for
such injuries. Having set up this policy, Judge Hand then criticized as invalid the
distinction between physical invasion damages and vibration-concussion damages.
The strict trespass-vs.-concussion dichotomy has been justified in New York
by saying that while rocks and debris can be controlled, the very nature of vibra-
tions and concussions is such that they cannot be confined within enclosed limits.
Therefore, it is held that if these injuries are rightfully caused, they must be
remediless. Stancourt Laundry v. Lamura, (City Ct.) 47 N.Y.S. 895 (1914).
A leading Maine case in 1950 reviewed extensively the authorities on this
subject, and then held that a complaint based on absolute liability was demurrable.
The opinion, however, appears to have relied mainly on the line of cases dealing
with the flooding of water stored on one's premises. Such a flooding-dynamiting
[Vol. X
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analogy fails to meet the arguments of Judge Hand in the Exner case, which turned
upon the intrinsic dangers of explosives. Reynolds v. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343,
75 A. 2d 802 (1950).
Massachusetts has regulated blasting activities, requiring blasting contractors
to post a bond to indemnify possible injured parties, but the Massachusetts courts
have held that this statute does not abrogate the common-law need to allege negli-
gence against the contractor, in order to reach the posted bond. Jenkins v. Toma-
sello, 286 Mass. 180, 189 N.E. 817 (1934).
While New York is generally cited as the leading jurisdiction for the negli-
gence-requirement theory, it should be noted that the strict holding of the Booth
case has been somewhat softened by a liberal application of the nuisance theory
in a later case. Here Booth was said to be an exception, restricted to its facts, and
the defendant quarry operator was held to be absolutely liable. A questionable
distinction was made between blasting which is temporary and improves the land,
as in Booth, and blasting which is repeated and does not improve the land, as in a
quarry operation. This holding creates considerable doubt as to the position of
New York in this controversy. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y.
509, 58 N.E. 2d 517 (1944).
There is considerable impressive authority for the absolute liability rule. It is
accepted by RESTATEMENT TORTS §519-520. The Exner case is also ruling in
Georgia. Brooks v. Ready Mix Concrete Co., 94 Ga. App. 791, 96 S.E. 2d 213
(1956).
Wisconsin does not require allegations of negligence or physical invasion.
In a case almost on all fours with the South Carolina case, the Wisconsin court held
the defendant liable for concussion damage, regardless of negligence, saying that
the New York rule embodied in the Booth case is only applicable in the peculiar
circumstances of Manhattan island, and should not be extended to ordinary blast-
ing situations. Brown v. L. S. Lunder Const. Co., 240 Wis. 122, 2 N.W. 2d 859
(1942).
A 1951 case in West Virginia held the defendant absolutely liable for his
blasting activities, and expressly rejected an attempt to liken the setting off of
explosives to the keeping of a wild animal. The analogy failed because explosives
endanger persons and/or property beyond the limits of defendant's property, while
wild animals do not ordinarily. Fairfax Inn v. Sunnyhill Mining, 97 F. Supp. 991
(N.D.W.Va. 1951).
The absolute liability rule prevails also in Pennsylvania. In a 1949 case so
holding, the court based its decision on the "ultrahazardous" nature of blasting
activities, and cited the modern Workmen's Compensation Laws as examples of
the same trend in American law. Federoff v. Harrison Const. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66
A. 2d 817 (1949).
Analyzing the opinions on both sides in this dispute, the South Carolina
choice appears to be wise. The policy arguments in favor of absolute liability for
blasting activities are strong and compelling. The arguments for the negligence-
requirement viewpoint are either restricted to a particular set of circumstances or
else are overly preoccupied with the formalistic differences between common-law
trespass injuries and consequential injuries.
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